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SAVING LIVES 
SHALINI BHARGAVA RAY* 
Abstract: When Alan Kurdi, a Syrian toddler, drowned in the Mediterranean 
while fleeing civil war in his home country, the world’s attention turned to the 
Syrian refugee crisis. Offers to transport and house refugees surged. Private boats 
set out on the Mediterranean Sea to rescue refugees dying in the water. A billion-
aire offered to purchase an island on which the refugees could live out their lives. 
This Article analyzes private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers, a subset of mi-
grants whose claims for refugee protection have not yet been filed or adjudicated, 
and who typically travel without authorization. This Article determines that much 
of this aid is currently illegal or operates under a cloud of legal uncertainty, prin-
cipally due to criminal laws prohibiting the smuggling, transport, and harboring 
of unauthorized migrants. In light of the compelling humanitarian interests at 
stake, as well as asylum states’ concern for national security, this Article argues 
for law reform to decriminalize private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers. 
INTRODUCTION 
Activists often speak as though the solutions we need have not yet been 
launched or invented, as though we are starting from scratch, when often 
the real goal is to amplify the power and reach of existing alternatives. 
What we dream of is already present in the world. 
—Rebecca Solnit1 
On the day of his death, Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi wore a bright red shirt, 
blue shorts, and sneakers. His family fled the violence in Syria and planned to 
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 1 REBECCA SOLNIT, HOPE IN THE DARK: UNTOLD HISTORIES, WILD POSSIBILITIES, at xvii (3d 
ed., 2016). 
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travel to the Greek island of Kos to apply for asylum, and then reunite with 
family in Canada.2 He and his brother, Galip, together with their parents, Ri-
hanna and Abdullah, boarded a dinghy boat from Bodrum, Turkey. Only Ab-
dullah survived.3  
Abdullah Kurdi was a barber from Damascus.4 The family found Damas-
cus a “cosmopolitan” oasis in an otherwise fractured region.5 Abdullah and his 
family, however, increasingly found themselves in peril as the conflict in Syria 
continued. In response to protests against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, 
the family relocated to Kobani, a small town along the Turkish border with a 
large Kurdish community.6 Despite not provoking either side, the family in-
habited a world of daily violence. In September of 2014, the violence wors-
ened, as the Islamic State (“Daesh”) shelled Kobani, sending families running 
for their lives. After younger extended family members witnessed a suicide 
bombing, the police sought out the male elders for questioning.7 At that point, 
the family decided to flee. 
Abdullah went first. He fled to Turkey, found work, and sent money home.8 
He eventually called for his own family to join him. Life in Turkey, however, 
proved impossible financially, as Abdullah was unable to support the four of 
them. He devised a plan to reunite with family in Canada. He borrowed money 
for a dinghy boat to carry his family from Bodrum to Kos, where they would 
apply for asylum.9 Once they received refugee status, they could travel to Can-
ada. Abdullah’s sister had already raised $20,000 to sponsor them.10 
Abdullah approached the journey with caution. Many had died on similar 
voyages; but some had lived, and those who had survived were thriving in 
their new homelands.11 A smuggler made the arrangements, and on September 
2, 2015, along with another raft of refugees, they set out on one of the safest 
routes to Europe.12 The sea, however, was wild, and the journey quickly turned 
perilous. The smuggler abandoned the boat, leaving Abdullah to take the boat’s 
tiller, “swerv[ing] over the waves.”13 The boat capsized. The family held on to 
Abdullah, who clung to the boat, kissed one of his sons, and implored them 
                                                                                                                           
 2 Anne Barnard, Syrian Family’s Tragedy Goes Beyond Image of Boy on Beach, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 27, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2jKtUqA [https://perma.cc/2WTW-GEQM]. Alan Kurdi is also re-
ferred to as “Aylan,” which is closer to the Turkish pronunciation of his name. Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See id. 
 13 Id. 
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both not to let go. Despite his efforts, the waves washed his family away: Ri-
hanna, Galip, and Alan, “one by one.”14 A day later, Alan’s body washed up on 
to the beach, face down, a lifeless doll. He was still wearing his clothes and 
sneakers.15 
The media widely reported the Kurdi family’s horror, and the story galva-
nized private citizens across the world.16 Donations to nongovernmental organ-
izations (NGOs) helping refugees spiked in the days following the discovery of 
Alan’s body.17 NGOs sponsoring private boats, which had been conducting 
search and rescue for over a year in some instances, saw increased donations 
and news coverage of their work.18 A billionaire businessman from Egypt pub-
licly announced a plan to purchase a Greek Island and name it after Alan.19 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Id. 
 15 Id.  
 16 See, e.g., Anne Barnard & Kareem Shoumali, Image of Drowned Syrian, Aylan Kurdi, 3, 
Brings Migrant Crisis Into Focus, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/
09/04/world/europe/syria-boy-drowning.html?mcubz=0 [https://perma.cc/TNW7-K77S]; Gordon 
Rayner, Aylan and Galip Kurdi: Everything We Know About Drowned Syrian Refugee Boys, TELE-
GRAPH (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11841802/eu-migrant-
crisis-refugee-boys-aylan-galip-kurdi.html [https://perma.cc/AUE2-2LY6]; Yaron Steinbuch, Photo of 
Drowned Toddler Causes Outcry Over Migrant Crisis, N.Y. POST (Sept. 2, 2015), http://nypost.
com/2015/09/02/photo-of-drowned-toddler-causes-outcry-over-migrant-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/
PN4G-YJ67]; Ishaan Tharoor, Death of Drowned Syrian Toddler Aylan Kurdi Jolts World Leaders, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/03/
image-of-drowned-syrian-toddler-aylan-kurdi-jolts-world-leaders/?utm_term=.bc1e1eb1336e 
[https://perma.cc/MZ5G-Q442]; Griff Witte, European Rail Service Hit Hard by Surge of Migrants, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2015, at A12. 
 17 Rick Gladstone & Karen Zraick, Donations for Refugees Surging, American Charities Report, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2suT9Bg [https://perma.cc/9P2F-ZCVW]; Lisa O’Carroll, 
Donate Cash if You Want to Help Syrian Refugees, Aid Groups Say, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 8, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/08/donate-cash-help-syrian-refugees-aid-groups-unicef-
wfp-say [https://perma.cc/B5TB-S47V] (reporting that charities experienced a significant donation 
increase after the photograph of Alan Kurdi’s body was released, with Save the Children receiving 
£1.2 million in just a few days); Megan O’Neil, Photo of Drowned Syrian Child Spurs Spike in Dona-
tions, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Photo-of-
Drowned-Syrian-Child/232957 [https://perma.cc/BV67-GKCX]. 
 18 See Jessica Elgot, Charity Behind Migrant-Rescue Boats Sees 15-Fold Rise in Donations in 24 
Hours, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/charity-
behind-migrant-rescue-boats-sees-15-fold-rise-in-donations-in-24-hours [https://perma.cc/B4RW-
PSRD] (Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) reported €150,000 in individual donations in a twen-
ty-four hour period, with a previous high of only €10,000); Jon Henley et al., Britons Rally to Help 
People Fleeing War and Terror in Middle East, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.
theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/sep/03/britons-rally-to-help-people-fleeing-war-and-terror-in-middle-
east [https://perma.cc/58L8-P35B] (Caroline Anning, of Save the Children, reported a seventy percent 
increase in calls and e-mails in a twenty-four hour period). 
 19 Keren Blankfeld, Africa’s 10th Richest Man Still Waiting to Buy a Greek Island to House Ref-
ugees, FORBES (Nov. 18, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kerenblankfeld/2015/11/18/africas-
10th-richest-man-still-waiting-to-buy-a-greek-island-to-house-refugees/#3b01ed672fde [https://perma.
cc/6Z9B-2LH8] (noting that Naguib Sawaris, the Egyptian billionaire who proposed buying and nam-
ing a Greek island after Alan Kurdi, is still waiting for Greece’s approval); Amanda Gomez, Egyptian 
Billionaire Wants to Buy Island for Refugees, PBS NEWSHOUR: THE RUNDOWN (Sept. 4, 2015), 
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Private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers,20 however, occurs amid legal 
uncertainty—and in some instances, outright prohibition. The United Nations 
Migrant Smuggling Protocol defines smuggling as occurring for “material 
benefit, direct or indirect,” but states are not required to adopt that restricted 
definition.21 As a result, states have remained free to criminalize private acts of 
aid as part of standard border control policy.22 The major Western asylum 
states, the United States, Canada, and the European Union, have overbroad 
statutes criminalizing all instances of alien smuggling and related offenses, 
regardless of whether done for financial gain. In the United States, the relevant 
statute prohibits a range of actions, including “bringing in,” transporting, “con-
ceal[ing], harbor[ing], or shield[ing] from detection” unauthorized migrants.23 
In Canada, prior to 2015, the anti-smuggling statute criminalized all acts of 
aiding and abetting anyone “coming into Canada” without authorization.24 Fi-
nally, in the EU, member states generally criminalize acts that facilitate unau-
thorized migration without any exception for humanitarian actors.25 Thus, for 
example, acts of rescue, when coupled with transport of refugees and migrants 
to the frontiers of an asylum state, are susceptible to prosecution if the receiv-
ing state does not consent to receiving those refugees and migrants.26 In 2004, 
Italy prosecuted an NGO carrying rescued African migrants from Ghana and 
Nigeria. The NGO, faced with no alternative, docked at an Italian port despite 
Italy’s express denial of permission to do so.27 Although a judge ultimately 
acquitted the NGO, the NGO’s prosecution has become a cautionary tale that 
private humanitarian actors tell to distinguish and protect their own work.28 
Similarly, in the United States, providing housing, food, clothing, and so forth, 
                                                                                                                           
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/egyptian-billionaire-wants-buy-island-refugees/ [https://
perma.cc/5NPK-NNWF]. 
 20 This Article uses the term “asylum seekers” to refer both to internally-displaced persons who 
intend to flee to seek humanitarian protection, as well as migrants who have fled their country of 
origin for the purpose of seeking humanitarian protection. See infra note 76. 
 21 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air arts. 3, 6, Nov. 15, 2000, 
2241 U.N.T.S. 480 [hereinafter Migrant Smuggling Protocol]. Article 6.1 criminalizes smuggling and 
related offenses, such as “enabling” an unauthorized migrant to “remain” in the destination state with-
out complying with the destination state’s requirements for lawful presence. 
 22 Combatting Migrant Smuggling into the EU: Main Instruments, PARL. EUR. DOC. (PE 581.391) 
7 (2016) (noting that most member states do not “decriminali[z]e humanitarian assistance to smuggled 
migrants”). 
 23 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2012). 
 24 Regina v. Appulonappa, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 754, ¶ 19 (Can.). The current statute prohibits organ-
izing, instigating, aiding or abetting entry into Canada that “is or would be in contravention of” the 
statute. Immigration & Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, § 117 (Can.) [hereinafter IRPA]. 
Generally, this includes acts such as trafficking, smuggling and hiding migrants for profit, but no 
longer applies to humanitarian assistance. Id. §§ 117–119. 
 25 See infra notes 243–245 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 247–258 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 247–258 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 110–114 and accompanying text. 
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has constituted illegal “harboring”29 because providing such aid facilitates asy-
lum seekers’ “unlawful presence.”30 Such legal doctrine has led to the prosecu-
tion of humanitarian actors, including individuals assisting Central American 
migrants in Arizona and Texas as part of the Sanctuary Movement of the 
1980s.31 
Since its inception, international law has avoided any explicit protection 
for private humanitarian aid to refugees.32 Although international law does not 
offer clear authorization for private humanitarian aid to refugees, some argue 
that such aid finds indirect support in international law.33 First, evidence sug-
gests that the drafters of the Refugee Convention believed that certain aid to 
refugees should not be criminalized, but the treaty stopped short of explicitly 
authorizing such aid (or forbidding its criminalization under a party state’s 
domestic law).34 Some scholars have drawn on international humanitarian law 
for support, suggesting that customary international law requires private indi-
viduals to provide temporary refuge to those fleeing war zones.35 The status of 
temporary refuge as a customary norm, however, is unsettled.36 Accordingly, 
international humanitarian law offers at best indirect support for the legality of 
private humanitarian aid to refugees. 
This Article argues that private humanitarian aid takes a variety of forms 
that benefit both asylum seekers and civil society. To realize the full potential 
of private humanitarian aid, the major Western asylum states—specifically, the 
United States, Canada, and the European Union—should decriminalize private 
humanitarian aid to asylum seekers by redefining smuggling-related offenses 
to require financial or material benefit of any kind, consistent with internation-
al law, or by adopting an exception for humanitarian assistance.37 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See infra notes 182–190 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 182–190 and accompanying text; see also Eisha Jain, Immigration Enforcement 
and Harboring Doctrine, 24 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 159–60 (2010). 
 31 See infra notes 182–190 and accompanying text. 
 32 See Arthur Helton, Ecumenical, Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee 
Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 493, 511 (1986) (discussing absence of explicit authorization for 
private aid to refugees in various international instruments). 
 33 See id. 
 34 See id.; see also U.N. ECOSOC, 2d sess., 40th mtg. at 8–9, U.N. Doc. E/AC.32/SR.40 (Sept. 
27, 1950) (comments of Mr. Juvigny, French delegate). But see Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (noting that recourse to the “preparatory work” of a 
treaty is permitted only as a “supplementary means of interpretation,” which suggests that a delegate’s 
comments have limited interpretive value). 
 35 See Helton, supra note 32, at 516 (noting that the United States recognizes “the international 
humanitarian norms of temporary refuge and nonrefoulement”). 
 36 See id.; see also Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic 
Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1168 (1990) (discussing a federal court’s ruling that 
Congress preempted the temporary refuge norm with the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980). 
 37 The U.S. Senate considered such an amendment as part of a package of immigration law re-
forms, but these reforms ultimately failed to become law. See Emily Breslin, Note, The Road to Lia-
bility Is Paved with Humanitarian Intentions: Criminal Liability for Housing Undocumented People 
2017] Asylum Seekers and Private Humanitarian Aid 1231 
Although other scholars have discussed U.S. state and federal laws that 
essentially criminalize private charity to undocumented immigrants, including 
asylum seekers,38 this Article is the first to offer a comparative analysis of the 
laws governing private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers with reference to 
the worlds’ richest asylum states and regions—namely, the United States, Can-
ada, and the European Union. This comparative approach is essential because 
the problem of how to treat those who assist irregular migrants is a global one. 
Unlike the narrower question of U.S. law, on which judges might disagree 
about the relevance of foreign states’ laws and practices, the question of how to 
treat private humanitarian actors assisting asylum seekers calls for a global 
response informed by international and comparative law. 
Apart from offering a unique comparative approach, this Article is also 
the first to propose a major statutory revision to refine the smuggling statute to 
limit liability to profit-seeking actors rather than on those who conceal asylum 
seekers from immigration authorities. Ultimately, this Article argues that under 
current legal regimes, too much private humanitarian aid is criminalized or 
potentially subject to prosecution, and thus, deterred. For this reason, citizens 
should insist that governments reform their smuggling laws. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes various manifesta-
tions of private humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers, and the legal 
framework within which they operate.39 Part II discusses national security and 
economic interests as primary motivations for criminalizing private humanitar-
ian assistance, both nationally and internationally.40 Part III proposes a legal 
compromise by criminalizing unauthorized migration activities that provide 
some monetary or material benefit to smugglers, but de-criminalizing not-for-
profit private humanitarian assistance.41 
                                                                                                                           
Under 8 U.S.C. 1324(A)(1)(A)(III), 11 RUT. J.L. & RELIGION 214, 241 (2009) (describing proposed 
humanitarian exception); Sean Higgins, Why Immigration Reform Didn’t Happen in 2007, WASH. 
EXAMINER (Nov. 20, 2012), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/why-immigration-reform-didnt-
happen-in-2007/article/2513987 [https://perma.cc/BKK7-EN7D].  
 38 This analysis has related primarily to the Sanctuary and New Sanctuary Movements of the 
United States. See Breslin, supra note 37, at 226; Kristina M. Campbell, Humanitarian Aid Is Never a 
Crime? The Politics of Immigration Enforcement and the Provision of Sanctuary, 63 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 71, 100–01 (2012); Helton, supra note 32, at 511; Gregory A. Loken & Lisa R. Babino, Harbor-
ing, Sanctuary and the Crime of Charity Under Federal Immigration Law, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 119, 123–24 (1993). Notably, criminal statutes prohibiting aid do not apply to individuals assist-
ing in preparing asylum applications or aiding asylum seekers who have filed an application but have 
not yet received a decision. I thank Peter Margulies for raising this point. 
 39 See infra notes 42–193 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 194–314 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 315–374 and accompanying text. 
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I. DANGEROUS JOURNEY AND THE MANY PLACES OF  
PRIVATE HUMANITARIAN AID 
This Part defines and describes “private humanitarian aid” in its many 
forms and explains its value to both asylum seekers and citizens of the states 
receiving them. Private humanitarian aid refers to assistance designed to pre-
serve life and human dignity, and ease suffering associated with “man-made 
crises” and natural disasters,42 provided by non-state actors for altruistic or 
non-material reasons.43 Humanitarian aid further connotes immediacy—
immediate relief from an imminent threat.44 Aid can also extend beyond such 
relief to longer-term provision of food, housing, medical care, and education, 
all informed by broad humanitarian, protective interests.45 
A discussion of private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers requires some 
analysis of the legal regime that produces asylum seekers’ dangerous journeys 
in the first place. 46 Asylum seekers principally undertake unauthorized travel 
because states offer them no travel authorization options.47 No country current-
ly offers an “asylum visa” to migrants who intend to apply for refugee status 
upon arrival in the asylum state.48 Thus, when driven from their homes, asylum 
seekers must use false papers or seek the services of a smuggler.49 These ave-
nues of travel subject asylum seekers to tremendous danger, which some pri-
vate humanitarian actors work to alleviate. 
Private humanitarian aid takes many forms, beginning in an asylum seek-
ers’ country of origin and ending in the asylum state. The most visible form of 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Defining Humanitarian Assistance, DEV. INITIATIVES, http://devinit.org/defining-humanitarian-
assistance/ [https://perma.cc/ASZ2-VC3A]. 
 43 Not all donations constitute “humanitarian assistance.” For example, if the nonprofit arm of a 
Silicon Valley company decided to donate coding lessons to asylum seekers to assist with job training 
in the asylum state, few would regard this as humanitarian aid, although it certainly would constitute a 
nonprofit donation. See, e.g., Coding Skills for Over 430,000 Young Africans and Refugees in the 
Middle East, SAP NEWS (Nov. 30, 2016), http://news.sap.com/coding-skills-for-over-430000-young-
africans-and-refugees-in-the-middle-east/ [https://perma.cc/BBG5-NY6A].  
 44 See RELIEFWEB, GLOSSARY OF HUMANITARIAN TERMS 29 (2008), http://reliefweb.int/
sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4F99A3C28EC37D0EC12574A4002E89B4-reliefweb_aug2008.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RHB-8FMH] (defining Humanitarian Assistance as aid that aims to preserve life 
and “alleviate suffering of a crisis affected population,” and which must align “with the basic humani-
tarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality”). 
 45 See id. at 8, 39. 
 46 See Hugh Eakin, The Terrible Flight from the Killing, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/10/22/terrible-flight-killing/ [https://web.archive.org/web/
20170422124739/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/10/22/terrible-flight-killing/] (describing the 
human toll of the lack of any legal course of travel for asylum seekers). 
 47 See, e.g., Slobodan Djajić, Asylum Seeking and Irregular Migration, 39 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
83, 84 (2014) (describing asylum seekers’ necessary resort to human smuggling due to lack of availa-
bility of any kind of entry visa to an asylum state). 
 48 Shalini Bhargava Ray, Optimal Asylum, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1215, 1219 (2013). 
 49 Id. at 1231 (“Thus, the asylum system expects and relies upon illegal or deceptive entry.”). 
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humanitarian assistance is rescue. Chris and Regina Catrambone, a wealthy 
couple, run a fully equipped yacht in the Mediterranean to rescue asylum seek-
ers and migrants from unseaworthy vessels.50 Their project, called Migrant 
Offshore Assistant Station (“MOAS”), has thus far rescued more than 30,000 
people.51 A group of German friends from Brandenburg similarly responded to 
“the devastating loss of life at sea” by buying a boat and setting out on the 
Mediterranean to provide “a civil sea rescue service” for asylum seekers and 
migrants in distress.52 An Eritrean Catholic priest in Switzerland facilitates 
rescue less directly by receiving calls from desperate asylum seekers and mi-
grants in the Mediterranean and then informing the Italian authorities of the 
boats’ location.53 
Rescue, though highly visible, is not the only form of private humanitari-
an aid offered in the wake of recent war-born migrations. The Pope has urged 
parishes in Europe to accept refugees into their homes.54 Individuals in Ger-
many have signed up to read to refugee children, teach asylum seekers Ger-
man, and offer job training, pending approval of the their asylum petitions.55 
Private individuals also rejected stingy government policy in Iceland. After 
Iceland’s minister offered to resettle a mere fifty Syrians, Icelanders created a 
Facebook page welcoming refugees, and in some instances, offering to house 
them; this page garnered 10,000 “likes.”56 A U.S. mother launched Carry the 
Future, an NGO that delivers baby carriers to refugee parents carrying their 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See, e.g., Jessica Elgot, Migrant Crisis: Good Samaritans Set Sail in Daring Mediterranean 
Rescue Mission, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/
migrant-crisis-good-samaritans-mediterranean-rescue-mission [https://perma.cc/G4J5-X7XV]; Sheena 
McKenzie, Meet the Wealthy Couple on a Mission to Save Drowning Migrants, CNN (Apr. 20, 2015), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/20/sport/boat-migrants-mediterranean-drown-moas/ [https://perma.cc/
RD23-VUM4]. 
 51 About MOAS, MOAS, https://www.moas.eu/about/ [https://perma.cc/36XY-F4FC]. 
 52 Sea-Watch Rescue Blog, HUM. RTS. AT SEA (May 1, 2015), https://www.humanrightsatsea.
org/news/sea-watch-migrant-rescue-blog/ [https://perma.cc/Y68P-VFDH]. 
 53 Mattathias Schwartz, The Anchor, NEW YORKER (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.newyorker.
com/magazine/2014/04/21/the-anchor [https://perma.cc/YGY5-SMG4]. 
 54 See Anthony Faiola & Michael Birnbaum, Pope Calls on Europe’s Catholics to Take in Refu-
gees, WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/refugees-keep-streaming-
into-europe-as-crisis-continues-unabated/2015/09/06/8a330572-5345-11e5-b225-90edbd49f362_
story.html [https://perma.cc/9FBM-36HL] (noting Pope Francis appealed to all religious communities 
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toddlers for hundreds of miles across Europe.57 An Egyptian billionaire sought 
to purchase a Greek island on which refugees could live out their lives.58 Pri-
vate humanitarian aid emerges where governments fail to meet the needs of 
asylum seekers and migrants. Fully understanding the impact of asylum states’ 
policies, and where they fall short, requires analyzing these diverse forms of 
aid together as a unified phenomenon. 
This Part describes private humanitarian aid to asylum seekers at each 
point along the geographic continuum: while asylum seekers reside in their 
country of origin, seek exit from their country of origin, travel to the asylum 
state, seek entry into the asylum state, and reside in the asylum state. By illus-
trating examples of private humanitarian aid administered in each place, this 
Part provides a foundation for subsequent analysis of barriers to private hu-
manitarian aid and the rationales for legal restrictions. 
A. In-Country Aid  
The first place where individuals and private organizations provide aid to 
asylum seekers is the asylum seekers’ home country. Such aid often takes the 
form of donations to NGOs such as the International Committee for the Red 
Cross (“ICRC”) or Doctors Without Borders (also known as Médecins Sans 
Frontières, or “MSF”). These NGOs provide basic provisions for daily life in 
war-torn places. For example, the Syrian Civil Defense, known as the “White 
Helmets,” has saved over 95,024 people from barrel bomb attacks in Syria.59 
This corps of unarmed and neutral rescue workers saves lives, secures build-
ings, and performs other public services to assist “people on all sides of the 
conflict.” 60 
Even though international relief organizations assist a broader population 
than just refugees, donations to such NGOs may still reflect the public’s inter-
est in helping refugees specifically. For example, after the New York Times 
published an image of Syrian toddler Alan Kurdi’s lifeless body, drowned in 
the Mediterranean, NGOs like MSF saw donations increase sevenfold.61 Alt-
hough MSF typically receives donations of $30,000 a day, donations spiked to 
$200,000 the first day after Kurdi’s photograph appeared in the papers and 
then decreased to around $80,000 four days later.62 Thus, members of the pub-
lic are ready to donate money to NGOs that help asylum seekers. Private aid 
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often takes the form of donations to NGOs working on the ground in asylum 
seekers’ home countries—even if those NGOs focus on issues beyond asylum. 
International relief organizations, however, often face political or practi-
cal restrictions to administering aid inside a conflict zone.63 Aid workers may 
face violence or death, bandits may steal supplies, and the home country’s 
government may severely restrict the operation of NGOs.64 In 2015, the United 
States inadvertently bombed an MSF clinic in Kunduz, Afghanistan, killing 
thirty patients and staff.65 MSF contends that it had supplied its GPS coordi-
nates to the U.S. military prior to the bombing, but the U.S. military nonethe-
less mistakenly thought the hospital to be “a Taliban-seized government build-
ing.”66 In another example, insurgents attacked humanitarian aid providers in 
Iraq during and after the Iraq war, because they mistakenly believed that aid 
workers were mere instruments of the U.S. military. 67 These incidents illus-
trate the inherent dangers of operating in a conflict zone, which often make it 
impossible to work within refugees’ countries of origin. 
Apart from political or practical impediments, some NGOs face concerns 
about their legitimacy. For example, the NGO Hand in Hand for Syria (“Hand 
in Hand”) was created in 2011 shortly after the Syrian crisis began, and it pro-
vides aid solely within Syria.68 The organization seeks to stabilize conditions 
so that Syrians do not feel compelled to flee.69 Hand in Hand claims to use 
funds raised from European donors to purchase food and medical supplies in 
Turkey, one of the places where it is officially registered, and in Syria to boost 
the local economy.70 The organization states that it then quickly provides aid in 
places that other NGOs fail to reach, such as locations behind front lines and in 
remote areas.71 Due to the scope of the conflict, Hand in Hand now operates in 
ninety percent of the country.72 
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A Canadian research group, however, has suggested that the organization 
actually supports political militants opposed to Assad.73 British authorities 
have also critiqued Hand in Hand for essentially serving as a cover for the Syr-
ian opposition.74 Even if this critique were inaccurate, and legitimate charities 
do disburse funds in Syria, funds are notoriously difficult to track once they 
arrive in the conflict zone. Authorities note that they cannot guarantee that 
funds do not support militants.75 Given the lack of clarity over the legitimacy 
of various relief organizations, donors often lack sufficient information when 
donating funds to assist displaced persons while such persons remain in their 
war-torn home country. These are the potential hazards of private aid in the 
country of origin. As a result, much of the private aid provided to asylum seek-
ers is provided in some other place. 
B. Exit 
Private actors also administer aid at the next place in the geographic con-
tinuum by facilitating asylum seekers’ travel out of their country of origin, of-
ten using unofficial channels.76 Human smugglers are private actors who facili-
tate exit, primarily by using fraudulent documents or arranging travel in ves-
sels not designed for humans.77 If such work is done for material benefit, it 
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cannot be considered “humanitarian.”78 Local smugglers in Syria, for example, 
oversee asylum seekers’ clearance “through all Syrian checkpoints on the way 
to Turkey” in exchange for bribes.79 As of September 2015, Europol estimated 
30,000 smugglers are transporting asylum seekers out of their countries of 
origin and into potential asylum states.80 
Private individuals often aid asylum seekers in exiting their home coun-
tries in more benign ways as well. For example, a family member might drive 
an asylum seeker across a border into a third country, where a smuggler might 
then provide a fake passport.81 The family member has privately aided the asy-
lum seeker in crossing the border, but then it falls upon a smuggler to provide 
papers and a plan to circumvent border controls.82 Ultimately, informal smug-
gling out of the country of origin remains a significant element of most asylum 
seekers’ journeys.83 
C. Rescue 
Once an asylum seeker crosses the border out of their home country and 
into a new territory, the journey to an asylum state begins in earnest. Private 
actors play an important role in preventing death along the way.84 For asylum 
seekers at sea or otherwise in transit to the asylum state, the risk of distress or 
death is real. At least 22,000 migrants have died “trying to reach Europe” since 
2000.85 In 2013, a group of 360 migrants, consisting of mostly Eritreans, 
drowned off the coast of the Italian island of Lampedusa.86 In just one month 
in 2014, 700 migrants and refugees drowned in two different shipwrecks.87 As 
a result, governments in recent years have conducted search and rescue opera-
tions to limit the humanitarian costs of traveling to Europe. In particular, Italy 
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conducted an operation called Mare Nostrum, which rescued at least 140,000 
people in 2014.88 Italy eventually suspended the program due to high costs.89 
The suspension of Mare Nostrum was part of the European Union’s de-
liberate effort to scale back rescue efforts in order to deter refugees and mi-
grants from making the journey in the first place.90 After suspending the pro-
gram, Italy transferred responsibility to Frontex, the European Union’s border 
agency.91 Frontex, for its part, conducted a much more limited operation on a 
fraction of the budget and without any of its own search and rescue vessels.92 
In fact, Frontex does not officially perform search and rescue or provide access 
to humanitarian protection.93 Limiting rescue efforts, however, failed to deter 
refugees and migrants.94 
In the face of government retrenchment, private humanitarian actors have 
entered the search and rescue arena. For example, MSF has been doing rescue 
work for over fifteen years.95 In 2015, MSF teams directly rescued over 20,000 
people in the Mediterranean and safely disembarked passengers in Italy more 
than eighty times.96 In addition, organizations such as MOAS97 and Sea-
Watch98 expressly focus on rescuing refugees and migrants in unseaworthy 
boats to prevent deaths on the way to Europe from Africa and the Middle East. 
These organizations serve to substitute, in part, government search and rescue 
programs, but they are only effective to the extent that governments cooperate. 
MOAS launched its first mission in 2014, a year after nearly 400 refugees 
and migrants died off the coast of Lampedusa, an Italian island where many 
asylum seekers find themselves before the government deports or processes 
them.99 The founders of MOAS, Regina and Chris Catrambone, were inspired 
to act by the Pope’s sermon condemning global indifference to the plight of 
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refugees and migrants.100 In response, the couple purchased a vessel for rescu-
ing refugees and migrants in distress at sea and named it the “M.Y. Phoe-
nix.”101 
MOAS has saved nearly 12,000 lives since the project began.102 Using 
high-tech drones and thermal night imaging to monitor major migrant shipping 
lanes, MOAS can detect the presence of distressed boats and quickly render 
aid.103 When it encounters a vessel in distress, the MOAS crew rescues the in-
dividuals at risk and provides water, food, and basic medical care until gov-
ernment authorities arrive.104 The crew typically consists of 20 people, and in 
2015, MOAS partnered with MSF to add two doctors to the crew.105 MOAS 
claims that, as an NGO, it is uniquely capable of approaching waters near a 
country’s coast, which means it can respond more quickly to distressed boats 
than vessels affiliated with a particular government.106 Thus, a lack of govern-
ment affiliation is an important characteristic of MOAS’s approach. 
Central to MOAS’s work is its collaboration with Maritime Rescue Coor-
dination Centers (“MRCCs”), facilities that states must provide to perform 
“search and rescue services round their coasts” under international law.107 The 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue establishes the re-
quirement of a system of MRCCs, consisting of centers and sub-centers, 
equipped to receive “distress communications” and to communicate with adja-
cent MRCCs.108 The International Maritime Organization set up a network in 
1979, known as Inmarsat, to enable ships to call for help “no matter how far 
out to sea.”109 In this way, international law has required states to create infra-
structure to promote rescue at sea, and MOAS’s work complements existing 
search and rescue practice. 
The Sea-Watch project is a similar private rescue operation run by a crew 
from Hamburg. Sea-Watch both reacts to distress calls and actively searches 
for distressed vessels, as many of these vessels lack satellite phone technology 
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and cannot make distress calls.110 Sea-Watch operates primarily in the summer 
months when refugees and migrants are most likely to undertake the journey 
across the Mediterranean, but its search and rescue operations continue into the 
fall.111 The organization undertakes “missions” that last about six days each, 
with a different crew each time.112 One of their main tasks is to locate dis-
tressed vessels accurately and then to rescue refugees and migrants from sink-
ing ships.113 Sea-Watch harbors refugees and migrants on board its boats tem-
porarily and provides life vests until Coast Guard ships arrive.114 
Like MOAS, Sea-Watch operates in an uncertain legal environment, at 
the intersection of the duty to rescue under international maritime law, rights 
under the Refugee Convention, and prohibitions contained in EU anti-
smuggling legislation.115 Under customary international law and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), states should rescue 
those in distress at sea.116 UNCLOS specifically establishes that “masters of 
vessels sailing under the flag of signatory States” in international waters have 
an affirmative duty to rescue individuals in distress.117 Additional legal support 
for rescue comes from both the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (“SOLAS”) and the International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue.118 Under these instruments, states are obligated “to cooperate and co-
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ordinate” rescue.119 The act of “rescue” is not complete until those in distress 
reach a “place of safety,”120 and courts have ruled that this “place of safety” 
must be a place other than the rescuing ship.121 Scholars have noted, however, 
that governments are not necessarily obligated to “disembark the survivors in 
[their] own area[s].”122 Thus, although governments must complete the rescue 
of those in distress, rescue is not tantamount to a right of admission to the res-
cuing state.123 
The tension evident in rescue work, however, originates outside of mari-
time law, for international refugee law itself places refugees in limbo on their 
journey to an asylum state. International refugee law guarantees neither a right 
to be granted asylum, nor a right to admission into an asylum state.124 The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) guarantees “the right to 
seek and to enjoy . . . asylum from persecution,” 125 but scholars have suggest-
ed that states understood this to secure the asylum state’s right to grant asylum 
without interference from the refugee’s country of origin.126 Article 33 of the 
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, however, prohibits asylum 
states from returning refugees to places where they would face persecution.127 
This raises the question: when does this obligation not to return arise? At the 
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border of an asylum state’s territory?128 On the high seas?129 At a pre-clearance 
point in an airport within the refugee’s country of origin?130 Or should the test 
be based on the asylum state’s exercise of jurisdiction, understood as “effective 
control”?131 
The European Court of Human Rights in Hirsi Jamaa & Others v. Italy 
ruled that states must “guarantee access to a fair and effective asylum proce-
dure for those intercepted who are in need of international protection.”132 In 
Hirsi, the court evaluated Italy’s responsibility toward refugees interdicted on 
the high seas.133 The court held that Italy was exercising jurisdiction extra-
territorially through its interdiction efforts.134 In a concurring opinion, Judge 
Pinto de Albuquerque opined that the European Convention on Human Rights 
ban on “collective expulsion” required Italy to provide some screening process 
to asylum seekers to determine if they qualified for humanitarian protection 
before turning them back.135 Thus, on this reasoning, states party to the Refu-
gee Convention, which prohibits refoulement, generally have an obligation to 
extend some asylum procedure to migrants outside of the migrants’ country of 
origin to determine whether they are in fact “refugees.”136 
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Such a right to an asylum procedure and the duty to rescue under mari-
time law, however, have clashed with anti-smuggling laws that criminalize the 
transport of unauthorized migrants to an asylum state.137 These anti-smuggling 
laws potentially render illegal some aspects of rescue,138 and the work of these 
NGOs reflects this ambiguity. Although these humanitarian actors publicly 
focus on preventing death at sea rather than obtaining legal entry or status for 
asylum seekers, such rescue efforts are difficult to divorce from the asylum 
seekers’ ultimate objective of effectuating an entry into the asylum state. Offi-
cially, MOAS states that its ultimate goal is to mitigate “loss of life.”139 MOAS 
will not act as “a migrant ferry,” and it will not rescue refugees and migrants 
exclusively, but it will use all “its resources to assist appropriate official Res-
cue Coordination Centers to locate and help suffering human beings and save 
lives where possible.”140 Although MOAS casts its efforts as merely supple-
menting existing government search and rescue operations, such efforts do 
much more. They necessarily present governments with decisions to make re-
garding the fate of refugees and migrants. For example, after rescuing refugees 
and migrants on a sinking boat in the Mediterranean and supplying them with 
water and groceries, what does MOAS do? In light of legal (and perhaps mor-
al) restrictions on transporting bona fide refugees back to their country of 
origin,141 the organization must eventually transfer rescued refugees and mi-
grants to a governmental authority, such as the Italian Coast Guard. But what if 
the Coast Guard refuses to accept them? What would MOAS do in such a situ-
ation? Although the law governing disembarkation of smuggled refugees and 
migrants is unclear, scholars indicate “there remains abundant State practice” 
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refusing to allow disembarkation in such situations.142 The organization does 
not indicate what it would do, or whether it has ever faced a dilemma of this 
kind.143 Ultimately, the clash of deeply held goals, “manageable migration sys-
tem[s]”, and human rights144 creates legal uncertainty for private humanitarian 
actors. 
Individuals and NGOs play an important role in saving the lives of asy-
lum seekers travelling in international lands and waters, but their work inher-
ently depends on government cooperation and remains vulnerable to legal 
scrutiny. NGOs operate with greater clarity when they emphasize the limited 
goal of saving lives rather than advocating for the broader rights of refugees 
and migrants or any particular durable solution.145 The ultimate question of the 
rights of refugees and migrants, however, cannot be avoided completely, and 
private humanitarian aid in the absence of government cooperation is incom-
plete or ineffective. Thus, even a seemingly benign form of aid—like saving 
lives in the ocean—carries risks for private humanitarian actors.146 
D. Entry 
Smugglers have a pivotal role at the point of entry into an asylum state. 
Anecdotes abound of Syrians who have hired smugglers to procure fake pass-
ports to facilitate travel to northern EU asylum states.147 In one harrowing in-
stance, a smuggler hid seventy-one refugees and migrants in a truck to 
transport them through Hungary to Austria, but all seventy-one refugees and 
migrants suffocated, their bodies discovered in Austria too late.148 Smugglers 
also routinely pack sixty people in a boat designed to carry a dozen.149 
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Some of these private actors seek profits. With refugees and migrants 
willing to pay $1,200 for transport of an adult and $600 for each child, smug-
glers can collectively amass millions of dollars a day, unmonitored.150 Syrian 
refugees and migrants reputedly are more selective with respect to smugglers, 
as they have more money and are willing to pay higher prices for more ac-
ceptable conditions.151 Thus, the huge flight out of Syria has proved particular-
ly profitable for smugglers. 
In contrast, some private actors serve refugees and migrants purely out of 
humanitarian concern, or even out of a sense of solidarity. For example, Hungar-
ians have volunteered to drive refugees and migrants to the Austrian border from 
locations in southern Hungary bordering Serbia and Croatia, despite new laws 
that criminalize such aid.152 Unlike smugglers or traffickers, these individuals 
offer to transport refugees and migrants for free, even though free assistance is 
often illegal.153 At least one such volunteer indicated that his own family mem-
bers were Jewish refugees, and he felt he could not ignore the plight of Syrians 
escaping both Daesh and Assad.154 The law, however, restricts many forms of 
private aid at this juncture without regard to humanitarian motives. 
E. Aid in the Asylum State 
The final place of aid in the continuum is the asylum state itself, where 
private actors administer aid to asylum seekers who have effectuated an (often 
surreptitious) entry.155 For example, private individuals might house refugee 
families, in keeping with the Pope’s exhortation.156 Or they might provide 
food, language training, or other services to refugee families.157 In Germany, 
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private individuals seek to assist refugees in a variety of ways. An elderly 
woman wished to read to refugee children, others donated toys at the church, 
and students at the University of Siegen organized daily language classes for 
asylum seekers staying in the university gymnasium pending the processing of 
their applications.158 In the United States, private humanitarian aid within the 
asylum state has occurred primarily in the Southwest, where asylum seekers 
enter from Mexico. For example, a humanitarian group, Humane Borders, left 
water jugs out along migrant trails in an effort to stem the tide of border-
crossing deaths in the southern Arizona desert.159 U.S. NGOs, however, have 
also taken the lead in finding novel approaches to linking “ordinary individu-
als” to asylum seekers in need outside of U.S. borders. For example, a U.S. 
mother, seeing footage of Syrian parents holding their toddlers on long treks 
from Greece to northern Europe, concluded that these parents could benefit 
from baby carriers to lessen their load and free their hands.160 Within the first 
month of operation, her organization received over 3,000 baby carriers to do-
nate.161 
Private humanitarian aid may also take the form of assisting asylum seek-
ers on a journey within the asylum state, and this may violate laws regarding 
the transport of unauthorized migrants within the jurisdiction.162 Groups like 
Samaritans and No More Deaths transported migrants to medical clinics when 
necessary, such as when migrants had fainted or had bloody limbs and were 
unable to walk.163 The NGOs contend these individuals would have died in the 
desert absent aid.164 The federal government responded, however, by prosecut-
ing these NGO volunteers for transporting unlawful migrants in violation of 
federal anti-smuggling law.165 
The American Sanctuary Movement (“Sanctuary Movement”) is the quin-
tessential example of private aid in the asylum state that the government con-
sidered illegal.166 In the 1980s and 1990s, countless religious humanitarian 
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workers assisted Central Americans fleeing violence in their home countries.167 
Sanctuary workers believed they had a moral responsibility to aid asylum 
seekers because many sanctuary workers subscribed to religious traditions, 
such as liberation theology, that require adherents to actively combat social 
injustice.168 Some sanctuary workers provided aid in transporting refugees to 
other places in the United States or Canada. Others merely provided a place to 
stay so that the particular asylum seekers they encountered would not become 
homeless.169 
Founded by Jim Corbett, a Quaker rancher in Arizona, the Sanctuary 
Movement arose out of a belief that U.S. policies of funding and training brutal 
regimes in Central America contributed to the instability and violence that 
drove asylum seekers to U.S. territory in the first place.170 Sanctuary workers 
believed not only that U.S. policy drove mass migrations, but that the U.S. 
government’s treatment of asylum seekers who had arrived in the U.S. violated 
international human rights law.171 Specifically, many Central Americans sought 
asylum, but U.S. asylum law recognized only a small proportion of claims 
filed.172 This followed principally from U.S. asylum law’s requirement that 
persecution occur on account of the asylum seeker’s political opinion or other 
protected characteristics rather than as a result of generalized violence.173 Cor-
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bett and others believed that Central American refugees may not have been 
individually targeted in all instances, but that they were entitled to protection 
under the 1949 Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War.174 Although the U.S. government dismissed Central American 
asylum seekers as “economic migrants,” sanctuary workers regarded them as 
Geneva Convention “refugees.”175 
According to sanctuary workers, U.S. government officials were the ones 
violating international human rights law. The sanctuary workers’ decision to 
follow international human rights law and violate U.S. government policy was 
the truly legal path forward.176 Many sanctuary workers sought to transport 
Central American migrants to Canada, where the migrants would be more like-
ly to win asylum.177 Although individuals and NGOs openly defied federal law 
in the name of a higher law—international human rights law, or “God’s law”—
they also sought to change the law, or the prevailing interpretation of it, to 
make their actions legal.178 Although some participants in the Sanctuary 
Movement believed they were opposing unjust laws as a form of “civil disobe-
dience,” others believed their humanitarian work was a form of “civil initia-
tive,” or more foundational social justice work. 179 Corbett, in particular, disa-
vowed the label “civil disobedience,” noting that sanctuary was premised on 
“civil initiative.”180 The concept connotes the preservation of civil society, not 
the pursuit of revolution; the use and adherence to law, not the resort to vio-
lence; direct humanitarian service, not political agitation and reform.181 
The federal government, however, dismissed the Sanctuary Movement as 
the work of individuals and organizations that believed they were above the 
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law.182 It responded by prosecuting sanctuary workers for “harboring” or 
“transporting” unauthorized migrants.183 The first prosecutions of sanctuary 
workers in the early 1980s resulted from undercover work by the former Im-
migration and Naturalization Service in what was known as “Operation So-
journer.”184 The operation deployed investigators and paid informants who 
posed as church volunteers.185 The informants gathered one hundred tape re-
cordings over ten months, culminating in the Justice Department decision to 
charge sixteen sanctuary workers,186 including Corbett and Pastor John Fife, 
often regarded as another founder of the movement.187 
As these prosecutions progressed in federal court, the government and de-
fenders of the sanctuary workers contested the legality of the movement’s 
work. Defenders claimed that the Refugee Convention, incorporated into U.S. 
law via the 1980 Refugee Act, implicitly authorized private humanitarian aid 
to refugees, regardless of their unauthorized entry into the United States.188 
They further argued that sanctuary workers had First Amendment rights to 
Free Exercise of Religion that authorized their humanitarian acts toward refu-
gees.189 These defenses largely failed, and courts concluded that providing 
food, shelter, and comfort to unauthorized migrants, including individuals 
whom the government might ultimately recognize as refugees, violated the 
anti-smuggling statute.190 
A final and more fantastical example of aid in the asylum state is the pro-
posal to create a new country to house refugees. Naguib Sawiris, an Egyptian 
billionaire, was so moved by Alan Kurdi’s death that he contacted the owners 
of two private islands near Greece with the plan to purchase one of the islands 
to house refugees.191 Committing $200 million to the project, Sawiris proposed 
buying an island to avoid creating competition between refugees and “lo-
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cals.”192 Similarly, businessman Jason Buzi proposed creating a “refugee na-
tion,” and experts have taken the idea seriously.193 
All of these examples of private aid are voluntary, charitable projects that 
advance humanitarian ends. As discussed above, however, the law frequently 
outlaws private humanitarian aid, especially at points of rescue, entry into the 
asylum state, and assistance therein, because powerful asylum states’ interests 
in sovereignty peak at these points in an asylum seeker’s journey. 
II. STATES’ INTERESTS IN CRIMINALIZING PRIVATE HUMANITARIAN  
AID TO ASYLUM SEEKERS 
All of the instances of private humanitarian aid described in Part I illustrate 
the groundswell of goodwill toward asylum seekers,194 but the law frequently 
frustrates this intense desire to provide humanitarian assistance. For example, 
U.S. law criminalizes the transport of smuggled aliens, which might encompass 
acts as innocuous as giving a ride within the country to anyone without a valid 
visa.195 Even acts of rescue on the high seas, mandated under international mari-
time law, might result in prosecution if coupled with transport to an asylum 
state’s territory.196 What interests motivate laws criminalizing private humanitar-
ian acts to aid asylum seekers? This Part analyzes the principal interests underly-
ing legal restrictions on private humanitarian aid. It identifies three principal in-
terests: national security, crime control, and economic preservation.197 It further 
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considers whether private humanitarian aid serves to “pull” more refugees and 
migrants into embarking on perilous journeys by creating a hope or expectation 
of rescue, and whether private humanitarian aid crowds out government re-
sources devoted to humanitarian assistance. 
A. Security- and Money-Based Interests 
Criminal laws in the United States, Canada, and the European Union, ap-
plicable to private humanitarian actors assisting asylum seekers, reveal con-
cerns about terrorism, crime, and economic preservation, both in terms of jobs 
and public spending. These considerations underlie government policies to 
exclude unauthorized migrants. These laws typically prohibit any person from 
assisting an unauthorized migrant in entering the territory of the asylum state. 
These laws also prohibit individuals from transporting, harboring, concealing, 
or shielding from detection any unauthorized migrant who has already entered 
the territory.198 These are essentially the same considerations that drive the 
criminal prohibitions on unauthorized entry into these states.  
1. Asylum Seekers as Threats to National Security and Sources of Crime 
The first and most significant interest in justifying limits on private aid to 
asylum seekers is national security.199 U.S. Presidents and Congress have used 
the term “national security” to refer to a range of concepts, such as the Ameri-
can constitutional system of government, U.S. economic interests, and the 
American “way of life.”200 Immigration law defines the term as “the national 
defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.”201 One 
of the principal functions of government under U.S. immigration law today is 
to screen incoming refugees and migrants for preferred characteristics.202 With 
this premise, accepting open borders or migration based on the private choice 
of current citizens or residents would render a nation vulnerable to security 
threats because such scenarios bypass the government screening process.203 
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Unscreened refugees and migrants entering a host state might commit an act of 
terrorism that harms people or the asylum state’s interests.204 
Refugees are often the lightning rod for these national security concerns. 
For example, Paris suffered three heinous terrorist attacks in one evening, all 
perpetrated by Daesh.205 Although none of the attackers was a refugee, politi-
cians characterized the attack as the product of an overly generous refugee pol-
icy.206 This, in turn, caused dozens of American governors to call for curtailing 
the United States’ refugee resettlement program, at least with respect to Syri-
ans.207 The governor of Texas even directed NGOs doing resettlement work to 
cease all aid to Syrian refugees.208 Although these state-level restrictions raise 
unique legal issues and are likely unconstitutional,209 they reflect the general 
approach of banning private humanitarian aid to refugees in the name of na-
tional security. 
Crime control is a related concern, and scholars have noted the frequent 
conflation of immigration enforcement, national security, and crime control.210 
Politicians and public figures have frequently linked higher rates of unauthor-
ized immigration with higher rates of crime, and an individual’s unauthorized 
migration with a greater propensity for law breaking generally. These asser-
tions lack empirical support.211 Border control agents, however, have reported 
significant rates of illegal entry by gang members, thus stoking fears of the 
“common criminal who enter[s] the United States illegally,” regarding the 
United States “‘as fertile ground for violence.’”212 Politicians have singled out 
refugees specifically as security threats.213 To the extent that private humani-
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tarian aid to asylum seekers bypasses the government screening process prior 
to their arrival, it stands to frustrate security-related objectives.214 
a. U.S. Law 
Security-related concerns drive some legal restrictions on private humani-
tarian aid. For example, federal law proscribes the knowing provision of “ma-
terial support or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations.”215 
Donors have been prosecuted for supporting nonprofits that are designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (“FTOs”).216 Thus, even aid in the country of 
origin, which does not implicate irregular migration and has the goal of keep-
ing displaced persons at home, may violate criminal prohibitions, in addition to 
incurring the inherent safety risks discussed in Part I. 
Federal criminal law reflects concerns for national security and crime con-
trol, as well as protection from “economic migrants.” Federal law prohibits hu-
man trafficking, which Congress has characterized as a “contemporary manifes-
tation of slavery.”217 The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (“TVPA”) 
criminalizes human trafficking and seeks to protect victims of trafficking.218 
Specifically, the portion of the TVPA codified in 18 U.S.C. section 1590 crim-
inalizes the harboring or transport of “any person for labor or services” in vio-
lation of the statute.219 Victims and perpetrators of trafficking are often irregu-
lar migrants.220 Commentators have posited that irregular migration itself 
threatens national security. Thus, to the extent that anti-trafficking laws attempt 
to curb irregular migration, they protect interests in national security and crime 
control.221  
Scholars have argued that this conflation of irregular migration with crim-
inality has imposed a variety of costs on migrants, including asylum seekers 
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and other vulnerable migrants.222 The view that irregular migration itself is a 
crime that threatens U.S. interests, for example, has led U.S. anti-trafficking 
law to emphasize the prosecution of “bad actors” at the expense of a more 
complete, accurate understanding of the causes of trafficking and the nature of 
markets that traffickers supply.223 By constructing trafficking as a problem 
“that is the sole responsibility of noncitizens and outsiders,” U.S. anti-
trafficking discourse further criminalizes trafficked migrants, who themselves 
are often undocumented.224 Thus, although the law views unauthorized migra-
tion as a source of criminal behavior in the asylum state,225 undocumented sta-
tus itself drives this perception of criminality.226 
Federal criminal law also prohibits “alien smuggling, domestic transpor-
tation of unauthorized aliens, [and] concealing or harboring unauthorized al-
iens,” among other offenses.227 Commentators have indicated that the anti-
smuggling statute was designed simply to exclude or remove unauthorized al-
iens from the United States.228 The statute creating criminal penalties for these 
offenses was originally passed as part of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act229 and was primarily concerned with regulating people who interacted with 
single Mexican men lacking familial ties to the United States.230 Congress 
struggled to define the crime of “harboring” and assumed that, much like the 
lawmakers of other countries, decisionmakers would be able to evaluate each 
situation and “assign culpability based on [that] assessment.”231 Congress 
passed the final version of the bill without defining “harboring,” and questions 
remained about whether and under what circumstances the knowing provision 
of assistance to an unlawful alien would be prohibited.232 This failure to define 
“harboring” led federal courts to interpret the statute in different ways. Initial-
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ly, courts focused on defendants’ intention to conceal aliens from immigration 
authorities, but later courts expanded the statute to cover any conduct “sub-
stantially facilitating” an alien’s unlawful presence within the territory.233 
This expansive interpretation effectively criminalizes many everyday in-
teractions with unauthorized migrants, such as sharing meals or offering a 
place to stay, with no exception for humanitarian assistance.234 For example, 
the statute has ensnared U.S. NGOs providing humanitarian aid near the border 
with Mexico. Volunteers with a group called No More Deaths were prosecuted 
for transporting migrants in need of medical care from the Arizona desert to 
hospitals or clinics in Tucson.235 By performing medical evacuations, the vol-
unteers had technically “transport[ed] aliens” in violation of federal law.236 
Although the charges were ultimately dropped, No More Deaths continues to 
face Customs and Border Protection’s scrutiny, culminating in a 2017 raid of a 
desert campsite medical clinic.237 American sanctuary workers faced a similar 
fate decades ago.238 Thus, anti-smuggling laws have criminalized acts of pri-
vate humanitarian aid.239 
b. International, EU, and Canadian Law 
Several international instruments also address smuggling and trafficking. 
Although they frame unlawful migration as a matter of international criminal 
law, they explicitly recognize an exception for humanitarian acts. The United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, drafted in 2000, is 
the foundational instrument.240 Its Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants 
by Land, Sea, and Air defines the “smuggling of migrants” to involve the “pro-
curement . . . of the illegal entry” of a person, who is neither a citizen nor a 
permanent resident of the country entered, for direct or indirect “financial or 
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other material benefit.”241 By limiting the definition to smuggling for “finan-
cial or . . . material benefit,” the Migrant Smuggling Protocol expressly ex-
cludes humanitarian smuggling from the ambit of criminal law.242 
In light of these international instruments, the European Union adopted 
several measures regarding smuggling. In 2002, the European Union adopted a 
directive on the “facilitation of unauthori[z]ed entry, transit and residence” and 
a Framework Decision on strengthening criminal laws on the same.243 The Fa-
cilitation Directive applies broadly to “any person who intentionally assists [a 
non-citizen] . . . to enter, or transit across, the territory of a Member State” in 
breach of that state’s migration laws.244 Although the Framework Decision 
contains a “savings clause” to avoid prejudicing the rights of refugees and asy-
lum seekers under international law, it does not define smuggling as narrowly 
as the Migrant Smuggling Protocol.245 As such, the Facilitation Directive and 
Framework Decision contain an expansive definition of smuggling. 
The European Union’s anti-smuggling laws have complicated the work of 
European NGOs saving lives on the Mediterranean. NGOs such as Sea-Watch 
note the legal uncertainty created by these laws, whereby humanitarian organi-
zations can become the targets of prosecution for assisting refugees and mi-
grants in distress if those refugees and migrants are brought to shore.246 Back 
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in 2004, Italy prosecuted Cap Anamur, an NGO that docked at an Italian port 
without authorization.247 The ship carried refugees and migrants from Ghana 
and Nigeria who had been rescued at sea.248 In executing the duty to rescue 
under international maritime law, the captain of Cap Anamur sought to bring 
the refugees and migrants to a “safe place.”249 No such safe place, however, 
consented to the docking.250 After a two-week standoff with Italian authorities, 
the captain docked the ship without authorization.251 Italy prosecuted the res-
cuers with the crime of “aiding illegal migration.”252 Five years later, the de-
fendants were acquitted.253 The court ruled that the master of the ship could not 
be liable for rescue because international law mandated such rescue.254 More-
over, the master of the ship was not liable for bringing the refugees and mi-
grants to the Italian coast without authorization because the duty to rescue, 
under international maritime law, includes the transport of those in danger to a 
“place of safety.”255 Scholars have argued that this “arguably extends the man-
tle of what constitutes a ‘rescue operation’ up until the point of disembarka-
tion, whether this is on to land or some other suitable facility.”256 On this view, 
merely holding rescued persons on the rescuer’s vessel does not discharge the 
duty owed.257 Although scholars contend that a finding of criminal liability 
under such circumstances would result in “manifest injustice,” governments 
continue to regard with suspicion the transport of rescued refugees and mi-
grants to their territory for processing.258 
For many years, Canadian law echoed these themes, and historically, the 
Canadian government has responded to asylum seekers’ unauthorized travel by 
prosecuting the private actors who organized the journey to Canada, whether for 
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profit or not.259 The government has also “aggressive[ly]” punished asylum 
seekers who assist fellow asylum seekers on the same unauthorized journeys as 
them by placing such individuals in inadmissibility proceedings.260 These pro-
ceedings are likely to extinguish their asylum rights permanently.261 Ultimately, 
anti-smuggling legislation in the major Western asylum states generally reveals 
little to no concern about potentially criminalizing private humanitarian aid.262 
2. Asylum Seekers as Economic Threats 
Concerns about the economic impact of asylum seekers on wages and 
jobs for existing residents of an asylum state also motivate the prosecution of 
humanitarian actors rendering aid to unauthorized migrants, even if those mi-
grants are ultimately recognized as refugees.263 Although some evidence indi-
cates that refugees are, in fact, an economic asset—perhaps due to the “stimu-
lative effect” on the economy—264 the public frequently views them as a liabil-
ity. 265 Restrictionists also imagine refugees requiring massive public support, 
stoking fears that refugees will strain public welfare budgets.266 Scholars, 
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however, have noted that the tendency for refugees to become assets or liabili-
ties to the economy depends largely on the policy framework in place in the 
asylum state.267 For example, in Uganda, where the law grants refugees free-
dom of movement and freedom to work, refugees have contributed positively 
to the economy and country as a whole.268 The notion that refugees are a mon-
olithic group that either benefit or burden a society misses the point that a par-
ticular society’s institutions facilitate or stifle refugees’ capacity to contrib-
ute.269 
As a historical matter, however, anxiety about the economic effects of ir-
regular migration has been the most significant concern behind calls for stiffer 
penalties for alien smuggling and transport, as well as for the creation of new 
offenses for harboring and concealment under U.S. law.270 President Harry S. 
Truman, in a message to Congress, highlighted the wage depressive effects of 
illegal immigration from Mexico, noting also the conditions for exploitation 
created when a group works under constant threat of deportation.271 He called 
for stricter smuggling and transport prohibitions, as well as punishment for 
harboring or concealing immigrants who entered illegally.272 Noting the diffi-
culty of sealing the entire U.S. land border to unauthorized entry, he concluded 
that these criminal laws would serve as tools to locate and process unauthor-
ized migrants and to discourage U.S. citizens from assisting their entry into the 
United States.273 Unsurprisingly, the legislative history of the anti-smuggling 
law reveals not a single mention of “persecution” or the possible refugee status 
of any aliens who enter illegally, for the Refugee Convention had not yet been 
drafted, and Central America did not become the site of widespread political 
violence and turmoil until the 1980s.274 Thus, the subsequent prosecution of 
NGOs for assisting asylum seekers was likely never contemplated when the 
statute was drafted and passed,275 because Congress was principally concerned 
about regulating migrants seeking economic opportunity, not asylum.276 
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B. Policy-Based Concerns 
Apart from concerns about national security, crime control, and economic 
preservation, there are other reasons to limit private humanitarian aid. First, 
private humanitarian aid simply may not be the right tool to address the mas-
sive humanitarian crisis facing refugees.277 Only the government can lawfully 
establish criteria for screening, meaning that private actors can never fully sub-
stitute for the government in managing migration.278 Further, humanitarian 
crises merit a coordinated, appropriately scaled response—another compara-
tive advantage of government solutions.279 This line of thinking presents a 
false choice, though, for none of these advantages of government action pre-
cludes meaningful private action in responding to the immediate human needs 
of refugees “in our midst,” whether within our borders or just beyond them.280 
Relying completely on coordinated state action also creates a risk that many 
people will go without the help they need.281 
Some may also worry that private humanitarian aid serves as a “pull fac-
tor,” drawing asylum seekers into perilous journeys with the hope of rescue 
and a better life, and that private humanitarian aid will displace government 
aid, or create incentives for governments to reduce already-limited support for 
search and rescue operations.282 These concerns require empirical analysis, but 
generally, they appear misplaced. First, asylum seekers and migrants continue 
to embark on dangerous journeys quite possibly because most people who un-
dertake them actually survive. Out of 1 million migrants who crossed the Med-
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iterranean without authorization in 2015, ninety-eight percent reached the 
shore safety.283 360,000 migrants successfully crossed the Mediterranean and 
roughly 5,000 died on the journey in 2016.284 Even if several thousand were 
rescued out of the population of migrants who undertook the journey, the vast 
majority still successfully completed the journey without rescue or humanitari-
an assistance. Thus, it appears empirically rational for migrants to continue to 
choose risky dinghy boat passage to Europe because, in fact, most survive. 
Second, critics have failed to establish a causal connection between in-
creased private humanitarian assistance and reduced government spending on 
search and rescue operations. Indeed, in some instances, the causation is re-
versed. For example, Italy ceased its highly successful, but costly, search and 
rescue program, Mare Nostrum in October of 2014.285 Triton, a program that is 
largely funded by the European Union, replaced it, but with an emphasis on 
border enforcement, instead of search and rescue.286 When deaths at sea 
spiked, private actors entered the arena to replace government aid that had 
already been eliminated.287 In addition, political pressure mounted on the Eu-
ropean Union to expand its search and rescue efforts, which resulted in a 
“commitment to triple Triton’s budget for 2015–16.”288 Thus, the presence of 
multiple NGOs performing search and rescue work has not had a chilling ef-
fect on governments. As a historical matter, the incentives have worked in the 
opposite direction, with government retrenchment prompting private humani-
tarian actors to intervene. 
Systemic restrictions on such assistance, however, might make sense gen-
erally in light of questions about the sustainability of private charitable inter-
ests and the accountability of private actors. If societies encourage private ac-
tors to provide humanitarian assistance to asylum seekers in need over a longer 
time period, what happens if and when private humanitarian actors become 
                                                                                                                           
 283 See Latest Global Figures, INT’L ORG. MIGRATION: MISSING MIGRANTS PROJECT, http://
missingmigrants.iom.int/latest-global-figures [https://perma.cc/LDP6-X9LB]. 
 284 Ben Quinn, Migrant Death Toll Passes 5,000 After Two Boats Capsize Off Italy, THE GUARD-
IAN (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/23/record-migrant-death-toll-two-
boats-capsize-italy-un-refugee [https://perma.cc/EQ6A-WPXR]. 
 285 Sea-Watch Rescue Blog, supra note 52 (“The general opinion in Brussels was that the greater 
the rescue capability . . . the greater the likelihood more migrants would attempt to enter Europe via 
these means.”). 
 286 Østerbø, supra note 282; see Glenda Garelli & Martina Tazzioli, The EU Hotspot Approach at 
Lampedusa, OPENDEMOCRACY (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-
it/glenda-garelli-martina-tazzioli/eu-hotspot-approach-at-lampedusa [https://perma.cc/9DGQ-4B96]; 
MareNorstrum to End—New Frontex Operation Will Not Ensure Rescue of Migrants in International 
Waters, EUR. COUNCIL REFUGEES & EXILES (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.ecre.org/operation-mare-
nostrum-to-end-frontex-triton-operation-will-not-ensure-rescue-at-sea-of-migrants-in-international-
waters/ [https://perma.cc/3YL6-EWUE]. 
 287 See Østerbø, supra note 282 (identifying dates when MOAS, Sea-Watch, and Norwegian 
Society for S&R began their efforts, after Mare Nostrum ended). 
 288 Id. 
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exhausted, find that they have taken on more than they can handle, or simply 
lose interest?289 Are private desires to assist asylum seekers sufficiently resili-
ent for the task at hand?290 Supporting asylum seekers in the process of apply-
ing for refugee status and then integrating into society is a long-term commit-
ment. The danger of permitting individuals to privately assist refugees of their 
choosing is that private interest in those refugees may prove short-lived. 291 
Relatedly, questions of accountability arise. How can we trust the quality of 
private humanitarian aid when it is decentralized, potentially capricious, and 
answers to no one?292 What oversight is required as to the quality of aid pro-
vided? Restrictions on private humanitarian aid might ultimately benefit some 
asylum seekers because private smuggling and housing could lead to exploita-
tion, particularly if the asylum seeker lacks a reasonable path to legal status.293 
Governments, however, can address many of these concerns through pru-
dent policy choices. For example, governments can educate volunteers and 
train them on best search and rescue practices or how best to meet asylum 
seekers’ needs during the period when their asylum applications are pend-
ing.294 Through such public-private partnerships, private actors can work to 
meet asylum seekers’ needs while answering to public standards.295 
Ultimately, security, crime control, and economic preservation are all 
generally legitimate interests that asylum states invoke to justify restricting 
private aid to refugees. To the extent that private aid might lead asylum seekers 
to bypass government screening, it creates potential security or crime risks and 
facilitates acts, such as smuggling, that are themselves viewed as crimes. Poli-
cy-makers should also consider the potential distortion of incentives that pri-
vate humanitarian aid might cause, both with respect to government commit-
ment to search and rescue and asylum seekers’ willingness to risk peril in trav-
elling to the asylum state. In the most recent mass flights from violence, how-
ever, these feared incentive effects do not appear to have materialized. 
                                                                                                                           
 289 Cf. Tracey M. Derwing & Marlene Mulder, The Kosovar Sponsoring Experience in Northern 
Alberta, 4 J. INT’L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 217, 227 (discussing Canadian private refugee spon-
sors’ frustrations with refugees’ “unrealistic expectations” that sponsors be “on call at all times”). 
 290 Cf. id. 
 291 See id. 
 292 See MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 31–
35 (2002) (discussing the lack of “accountability mechanisms” over private organizations receiving 
public funding). 
 293 Cf. Krzystof Kotsarski & Samuel Walker, Privatizing Humanitarian Intervention? Mercenar-
ies, PMCs and the Business of Peace, 7 IUS GENTIUM: COMP. PERSP. L. & JUST. 239, 257 (2011). 
 294 E.g., Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, GOV’T CANADA (last updated 
May 26, 2017), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/ref-sponsor/index.asp [https://
perma.cc/GZW3-LDLG] [hereinafter Canadian Private Refugee Sponsorship program]. 
 295 See MINOW, supra note 292, at 142 (“It should not be controversial to insist that public values 
follow public dollars.”). 
2017] Asylum Seekers and Private Humanitarian Aid 1263 
C. The Case for Private Humanitarian Aid 
Private individuals and NGOs have an important role in responding to the 
needs of migrants. A complete exploration of the philosophical arguments re-
lating to the role of NGOs and private humanitarian actors in civil society is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but at the most basic level, private humanitar-
ian aid is important because it defends human life and promotes related rights 
articulated by international human rights law.296 It further stands to strengthen 
civil society by providing a space for individuals to act freely and to strengthen 
democratic capacities of those who participate.297 Finally, it provides an ave-
nue for expressing dissent from government policy and constructing a positive 
vision of the law.298 
International human rights law protects many rights.299 Core rights relate 
to life, bodily integrity, freedom of movement, and freedom from state-
imposed harm.300 Asylum seekers are typically fleeing threats to these core 
rights. Humanitarian aid in the form of funding or providing basic needs, such 
as food, shelter, clothing, and medical care, helps preserve life—in either the 
country of origin or in the asylum state. Acts of rescue along the way also pre-
serve life, often dramatically.301 Such aid protects fundamental rights, because 
without it some asylum seekers would lose their lives. In this way, private hu-
manitarian aid is valuable because it protects fundamental rights recognized by 
international human rights law. 
Promoting and protecting private humanitarian aid also stands to 
strengthen civil society. As Corbett and other participants in the Sanctuary 
Movement have noted, serving those in need remedies injustice more directly 
than petitioning the government to pass a law to require government officials 
to do the same.302 Private humanitarian aid places the tools of justice in the 
hands of non-state actors, empowering and strengthening those non-state ac-
                                                                                                                           
 296 See infra notes 299–314 and accompanying text. 
 297 See infra notes 299–314 and accompanying text. 
 298 See infra notes 299–314 and accompanying text. 
 299 See UDHR, supra note 125 (containing thirty articles, almost all of them declaring individual 
rights); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
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part); ERIC POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW app. at 151–61 (2014). 
 300 The rights to life, freedom from torture, and freedom of movement are protected by both the 
UDHR and ICCPR. UDHR, supra note 125, at arts. 3, 5, 13; ICCPR, supra note 299, at arts. 6, 7, 12. 
 301 See MOAS Saves Migrants at Sea in Record Numbers: More Than 1,400 Saved from Inhu-
mane Conditions in First Two-Week Mission, MOAS, https://www.moas.eu/moas-saves-migrants-at-
sea-in-record-numbers-more-than-1400-saved-from-inhumane-conditions-in-first-two-week-mission/ 
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AS) helped rescue 1,441 people in just 12 days in back-to-back sea rescues from unseaworthy boats in 
the central Mediterranean Sea.”). 
 302 See Corbett, supra note 173. 
1264 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1225 
tors entrusted to “do justice” themselves.303 It is, in this sense, justice unmedi-
ated. It permits the expression of dissent304 but also the communication of a 
positive vision of the law.305 
Opportunities for private individuals and groups to aid asylum seekers 
have other value for society as a whole.306 Acts of private humanitarian aid, 
unlike state-sponsored humanitarian action, embody and promote essential 
freedoms, such as expression and association.307 Individuals can join together, 
publicly asserting their values, ideas, and visions through action and through 
communication with others.308 More generally, engagement in associational 
activities promotes pluralism, tolerance, and solidarity.309 Scholars have de-
fined pluralism as “the lively interaction among inherited particularities,” a 
process through which new particularities evolve.310 When people experience 
pluralism and participate in a range of associational activities, individuals’ 
sense of their own effectiveness grows, promoting tolerance.311 This, in turn, 
creates space for solidarity.312 Ultimately, scholars have argued that participat-
ing in associational activities allows individuals to develop critical faculties 
such as arguing, deliberating, decision making, and taking responsibility that 
then redound to the benefit of a democratic society as a whole.313 
The law should facilitate private humanitarian aid because it creates space 
for ordinary individuals to act in big and small ways, and slowly change socie-
                                                                                                                           
 303 Corbett, supra note 173; Bezdek, supra note 181, at 910. 
 304 Cf. Huyen Pham, When Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115, 1147 (2009) (not-
ing that state and local governments enact “moving border laws” to express symbolic messages of 
disagreement with the federal government). 
 305 See Bezdek, supra note 181, at 905. 
 306 See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a Representa-
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 307 MINOW, supra note 292, at 44 (noting that nonprofits play a key role in democratic society 
through “vitaliz[ing] civil society,” promoting First Amendment freedoms of association and expres-
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this context. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 7 (1958) (“Action . . . corresponds to the 
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Hannah Arendt, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., (July 27, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
arendt/#ActFrePlu [https://perma.cc/4GJN-D86Y]. 
 309 See Bucholtz, supra note 306, at 576. 
 310 Id. at 573 (citing PETER L. BERGER & RICHARD I. NEUHAUS, TO EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE 
ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURE IN PUBLIC POLICY 206 (1977)). 
 311 Id. at 573. 
 312 Id. at 565 (noting that a leading commentator has concluded that “the nonprofit sector pro-
motes solidarity among individuals, and thereby empowers them to influence activities in the public 
sector”). 
 313 Id. at 576 (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 516 (J.P. Mayer ed. 
& George Lawrence trans., Harper Perennial 1966) (1840)). 
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ty until a time when the humanitarian aid provided by private people is no 
longer necessary. It provides “hope in the dark.”314 
III. LAW REFORM TO UNLEASH PRIVATE HUMANITARIAN  
AID TO ASYLUM SEEKERS 
Private humanitarian actors have the desire to assist asylum seekers, but 
states also have an interest in criminalizing smuggling, trafficking, harboring, 
and related conduct involving unauthorized migrants, including asylum seek-
ers. This Part considers potential reforms to mediate this seemingly impossible 
division. It considers the broader context for asylum seekers’ dangerous travel 
and two specific responses: first, the notion of protected entry procedures; and 
second, a humanitarian exception to smuggling and related crimes, or possibly 
redefining smuggling to require proof of “material benefit, direct or indirect,” 
consistent with the standard articulated in the Migrant Smuggling Protocol.315 
A. Protected Entry Procedures 
Under current legal regimes, asylum seekers must resort to dangerous 
journeys to reach asylum states, thus triggering the need for search and rescue 
and other humanitarian assistance.316 Scholars and policymakers alike have 
called for asylum states’ governments to issue asylum visas so that asylum 
seekers can travel by air or other common carriers rather than on unseaworthy 
vessels or other hazardous means.317 Such a proposal has significant costs and 
benefits,318 but inaction and a complete failure even to consider the matter has 
taken a horrible human toll.319 Such measures should become a regular part of 
                                                                                                                           
 314 See generally SOLNIT, supra note 1 (cataloging and comparing pivotal moments of social 
activism across the globe from the late 1980s to the early 2000s). 
 315 Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 3. 
 316 See infra notes 317–319 and accompanying text. 
 317 Eakin, supra note 46 (describing the human toll of a lack of any legal course of travel for 
refugees); Gregor Noll, Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry Under International Law?, 17 
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tions. This suggestion is inspired by an analog, the private refugee sponsorship program in Canada. 
See Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, supra note 294. An analysis of the pro-
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the conversation on the legal status of asylum seekers and the private humani-
tarian actors who assist them. 
B. Governments Should Define “Smuggling” and Related Offenses to 
Require Financial or Material Benefit or Adopt a  
Humanitarian Exception 
Second, governments receiving asylum seekers should reform anti-
smuggling statutes to shift the law’s focus away from the prevention of border-
crossing and toward protecting migrants from exploitation. For-profit human 
smuggling and trafficking produces serious harm, and exploitation is most 
likely to occur when smugglers and traffickers engage in for-profit smuggling 
and trafficking.320 The U.S. anti-smuggling statute currently imposes criminal 
penalties on:  
any person who—(i) knowing that a person is an alien, brings to or 
attempts to bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever 
[that alien] at a place other than a designated port of entry . . . ; (ii) 
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come 
to, entered, or remain in the United States in violation of law, trans-
ports, or moves or attempts to transport or move . . . such alien with-
in the United States . . . in furtherance of such violation of law; (iii) 
knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come 
to, entered, or remains in the United States in violation of law, con-
ceals, harbors, or shields from detection . . . such alien in any place 
. . . .321 
The statute lacks any express exception for humanitarian smuggling, transport, 
shielding, concealing, or harboring.322 Instead, it criminalizes the facilitation of 
noncitizens’ unlawful presence,323 even if those noncitizens have a credible 
asylum claim.324 Scholars, however, have observed that Congress never in-
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 320 See Firas Nasr, Refugees and Trafficking: A Dangerous Nexus, HUM. TRAFFICKING SEARCH 
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 324 See Leitman & Hudson, supra note 228, at 47–48; Loken & Babino, supra note 38, at 138. 
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tended for the law to criminalize humanitarian aid,325 and thus, an exception 
should be created explicitly in the legislative text to prevent the prosecution of 
humanitarian actors. 326 Merely relying on prosecutorial discretion is insuffi-
cient to prevent this outcome, as evidenced by the sanctuary prosecutions of 
individuals for sheltering or transporting unauthorized migrants who they be-
lieved were refugees eligible for asylum.327 When government officials remain 
free to target humanitarian actors, they will do so. The following subsections 
discuss several specific options for pursuing reform. 
1. Defining Offenses to Require Proof of “Financial or Material Benefit” 
The first option is for legislatures to redefine smuggling and related of-
fenses to require proof of “financial or . . . material benefit,” thereby excluding 
humanitarian assistance.328 The Migrant Smuggling Protocol defines smug-
gling in terms of acting intentionally “in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, 
a financial or other material benefit.”329 Such a broad benefit clause was de-
signed to close potential loopholes for smugglers receiving indirect benefits, 
including sexual gratification, as related to child pornography rings or traffick-
ing schemes.330 Scholars note that the Protocol’s Interpretive Notes reveal that 
the parties did not intend for the Protocol to require states to criminalize hu-
manitarian smuggling by family, religious groups, or NGOs.331 Thus, the one 
major international treaty on the subject insulates private humanitarian actors 
from criminal liability for humanitarian smuggling.332 
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It is critical to consider the implications of the “financial or material bene-
fit” standard on the influential Migrant Smuggling Protocol. For example, 
would salaries received by employees of rescue organizations count as finan-
cial or material benefit, direct or indirect, thus requiring that all rescue be per-
formed on a volunteer-basis or without the provision of food, drink, or safety 
equipment to workers?333 Or might the law be construed to require that the 
benefit come from the provision of service to the smuggled migrants, such as 
payment by family members or smugglers from an earlier leg of the journey? 
An analogy to insider trading liability, in the context of liability for tip-
pers who reveal inside information about a corporation and tippees who trade 
on that inside information, under U.S. securities law might prove instructive.334 
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that a tipper breaches a duty if, for 
example, the tipper “receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the dis-
closure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate 
into future earnings.”335 Thus, in a sense, the disclosure itself must be the 
source of the benefit—not a random third party.336 As applied to the example 
of salaried NGO employees, one might compare the NGO employee to a tip-
per, and the rescued migrant to the tippee. In rescuing a migrant, the NGO em-
ployee performs a service, just as a tipper would offer a service to the tippee in 
the form of a disclosure of information. But in the usual case, the NGO em-
ployee would not receive a financial or material benefit from performing the 
service (the “disclosure”). Instead, the NGO employee’s financial or material 
benefit—the salary for working as an NGO staff member, for example—would 
be attributable to potentially unknown philanthropic donors. This is like a tip-
per disclosing information, doing nothing else, and then enjoying a nice dinner 
out, his friend’s treat, to congratulate him on his work anniversary. Such a ben-
efit has nothing to do with the particular act of service or “disclosure,” alt-
hough it might relate generally to the work the tipper does. Thus, one can ar-
gue that, even though the current international framework lacks such nuanced 
treatment of private humanitarian actors, there are workable frameworks avail-
able to parse liability to target better the population of smugglers the parties to 
the treaty intended to target, but without ensnaring humanitarian actors, even 
those who earn salaries for their work. Ultimately, humanitarian actors might 
passively receive benefits (from someone) while transporting unauthorized 
migrants, but this is not equivalent to those actors transporting unauthorized 
migrants for the purpose of receiving financial or other material benefits. 
                                                                                                                           
 333 See Migrant Smuggling Protocol, supra note 21, at art. 6. 
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2. Recent Canadian Precedent 
Heeding the Migrant Smuggling Protocol’s framework, the Canadian Su-
preme Court recently struck down Canada’s anti-smuggling law as unconstitu-
tionally overbroad due to its possible application to humanitarian actors.337 At 
the relevant time, section 117 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(“IRPA”) stated: “No person shall knowingly organize, induce, aid or abet the 
coming into Canada of one or more persons who are not in possession of a vi-
sa, passport or other document required by this Act.”338 The Canadian Supreme 
Court recently determined that the statute unconstitutionally failed to distin-
guish humanitarian smuggling from for-profit smuggling. The court character-
ized the text of the disputed provision as “broad.”339 The court also determined 
that the actual object of the statute was narrower on account of Canada’s inter-
national obligations, the role of the disputed provision in the overall scheme, 
and statements of legislative purpose at the time the statute was passed.340 
First, the court examined Canada’s international obligations, focusing on 
Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, which prohibits states from penalizing 
refugees’ illegal entry when refugees flee a place where “their lives or freedom 
are threatened” and who promptly seek to “show good cause” for entering the 
country without authorization.341 Canadian law reflects this principle, as IRPA 
section 133 prohibits the authorities from charging foreigners with “illegal en-
try or presence while their refugee claims are pending.”342 The court further 
noted that refugees often flee in groups, and thus, may aid others in entering 
Canada illegally. A state cannot punish refugees solely for their act of aiding 
others in illegal entry. The court also determined that the Smuggling Protocol’s 
material or financial benefit element indicates a desire not to criminalize hu-
manitarian smuggling. Although states are free to do so, the Protocol’s “sav-
ings clause” provides that the Protocol shall not affect states’ other responsibil-
ities and obligations under humanitarian and human rights law. Thus, the court 
determined that the disputed provision’s purpose must be harmonized with 
Canada’s international obligations to limit it to smuggling in the context of 
organized crime.343 
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 338 Id. ¶ 19. Canada’s anti-smuggling law addressed smuggling only—the transgression of the 
Canadian border—and not subsequent assistance, unlike the U.S. anti-smuggling statute, which also 
addresses post-entry acts such as harboring. 
 339 Id. ¶ 36. 
 340 Id. ¶ 34. 
 341 Id. ¶ 42 (quoting the Refugee Convention, supra note 127, at art. 31). 
 342 Id. ¶ 43. 
 343 Id. ¶ 45. 
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The court next observed that the role of IRPA section 117 within the 
broader statutory framework and the statements of legislative purpose also 
supported finding a narrower purpose. Specifically, section 117 mirrors the 
language of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, a scheme created to penalize 
smuggling in the context of organized crime rather than humanitarian assis-
tance.344 Further, at the time section 117 was adopted, the Canadian Parliament 
expressly indicated its desire to shield humanitarian actors and immediate fam-
ily members from prosecution, but these concerns never made their way into 
the statutory text.345 The court determined that Parliament itself understood 
that the statute would likely ensnare humanitarian actors, contrary to Parlia-
ment’s intent.346 Nonetheless, Parliament apparently believed this possibility 
would not come to pass because the Attorney General (AG) authorized all 
prosecutions and presumed that the AG would not authorize the prosecution of 
humanitarian actors. The Canadian Supreme Court rejected this purported safe-
ty valve of AG screening and concluded that, essentially, Parliament threw up 
its hands and passed a law that codified a “drafting dilemma.”347 
As a result, the court deemed the actual purpose of section 117 to be far 
narrower than it initially appeared. Unlike U.S. First Amendment jurispru-
dence, Canadian jurisprudence regards a statute as unconstitutionally over-
broad if it “deprives individuals of life, liberty or security of the person in cas-
es that do not further [its] object.”348 As section 117 of IRPA covered classes of 
conduct beyond the narrow purpose of the statute, it was overbroad. Accord-
ingly, the court struck down the law and invited Parliament to redraft the anti-
smuggling statute.349 
This result offers a point of comparison to the U.S. legal regime. In both 
instances, the law-making bodies expressly indicated a desire not to ensnare 
humanitarian actors. In the United States, government officials deliberately 
pursued such prosecutions to advance an anti-migrant agenda years later. Can-
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 349 Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. ¶ 86. The Canadian law was already narrower in scope than the U.S. 
law, as it focused on transgressing the national boundary, not on transporting, harboring, concealing 
or shielding upon entry. Nonetheless, the Canadian Supreme Court still found the law insufficiently 
focused on the true “bad actors,” for-profit smugglers. Id. It stands to reason that the U.S. law, which 
more broadly covers harboring after entry and not merely transgression of the national boundary, 
requires refinement as well. 
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ada has a similar history of responding to asylum seekers and those who assist 
them with prosecution and inadmissibility proceedings, where relevant.350 
Poorly drafted statutes from decades ago have inadvertently empowered to-
day’s prosecutors to pursue harsh, anti-migrant policies. 
3. Statutorily-Based “Humanitarian” Exception 
Ultimately, the Migrant Smuggling Protocol and recent Canadian Su-
preme Court decisions suggest an emerging consensus that states should define 
smuggling and related offenses to require “material benefit.” The proposal, 
however, is controversial, and some have criticized the “material benefit” re-
quirement as creating a loophole for smugglers. Arguing that prosecutors lack 
methods at the border to investigate and uncover facts to prove this “material 
benefit” element,351 critics contend that it can be impossible to prove that the 
smugglers expected or received payment.352 They assert the “benefit” element 
has thereby suppressed convictions for for-profit smuggling.353 
To some extent, the choice for lawmakers is between over- and under-
inclusion. States may purport to prefer erring on the side of prosecuting too 
many rather than too few, but the drafting history of the relevant statutes in the 
United States and Canada indicates that legislators actually held no such pref-
erence.354 In fact, lawmakers in both countries expressed concern about the 
effects of anti-smuggling laws on humanitarian actors or immediate family 
members of smuggled persons.355 At least one nation’s highest court has found 
over-inclusion impermissible.356 
As an alternative, to the extent that requiring proof of “benefit” may 
thwart the prosecution of criminal, for-profit smuggling, states might consider 
adopting a “humanitarian” exception. In 2006, the U.S. Senate considered a 
humanitarian exception to certain offenses as part of comprehensive immigra-
tion reform. 357 The package of reforms never became law because the Senate 
passed the bill containing them, but the House did not.358 The text of this pro-
                                                                                                                           
 350 Grant, supra note 259. 
 351 Aljehani, supra note 242, at 128 (noting the difficulty of establishing “an intention or agree-
ment to receive payment” in the “initial stages of investigations” due to a lack of “investigative meth-
ods used at borders”). 
 352 See id. 
 353 Id. 
 354 See Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. ¶ 38 (discussing Parliament’s intention not to apply the anti-
smuggling law to humanitarian actors); Jain, supra note 30 at 160–61(discussing legislative history).  
 355 See Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. ¶ 38; Jain, supra note 26 at 160–61. 
 356 Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. ¶ 77. 
 357 Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 205(c)(1) (as passed 
by Senate May 25, 2006) [hereinafter CIRA]; see also 152 CONG. REC. S5174 (daily ed. May 25, 
2006) (remarks of Sen. Durbin describing humanitarian exception). 
 358 See CIRA, supra note 357; S. 2611 (109th): Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2006, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/109/s2611 [https://perma.cc/N4UC-FHJL]. 
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posal added a provision to the anti-smuggling statute that insulated humanitar-
ian aid from criminal liability: 
It is not a violation of [statutory provisions prohibiting alien harbor-
ing, concealing, shielding, or transporting] . . . (B) for an individual 
or organization, not previously convicted of a violation of this sec-
tion, to provide an alien who is present in the United States with 
humanitarian assistance, including medical care, housing, counsel-
ing, victim services, and food, or to transport the alien to a location 
where such assistance can be rendered.359 
This illustrative list of forms of humanitarian assistance creates a “blanket ex-
ception” to criminal liability for all offenses other than smuggling, thus indi-
cating that humanitarian actors would still face liability for assisting unauthor-
ized migrants in entering U.S. territory, or “smuggling.” 360 
In general, where the description of a criminal offense is complete with-
out considering the exception, the absence of the exception is not an “element” 
of the crime that the prosecution must prove.361 Smuggling and related offens-
es can be defined without reference to their humanitarian quality and without 
consulting the list of exceptions. Thus, an exception to anti-smuggling statutes 
would likely function as an affirmative defense rather than an element of the 
statute that the government would have to prove. Under this regime, states 
would initiate prosecutions of humanitarian actors for a smuggling-related of-
fense.362 The humanitarian actors would then assert the statutorily defined de-
fense and bear the burden of proving that their work was truly “humanitarian.” 
This approach would insufficiently protect humanitarian actors because it 
would subject them to criminal prosecution and only protect them from crimi-
nal liability only later, offering immunity from liability, but not prosecution.363 
                                                                                                                           
 359 CIRA, supra note 357, § 205(c)(1) (proposed amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012)); see 
Breslin, supra note 37, at 241. 
 360 Breslin, supra note 37, at 241–42. 
 361 See McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 357 (1922) (“[I]t has come to be a settled rule 
in this jurisdiction that an indictment . . . on a general provision defining the elements of an offense 
. . . need not negative the matter of an exception made by a proviso or other distinct clause.”); United 
States v. Cook, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 168, 173–74 (1872) (“[I]f the language of the section defining the 
offence is so entirely separable from the exception that the ingredients constituting the offence may be 
accurately and clearly defined without any reference to the exception, the pleader may safely omit any 
such reference.”). 
 362 Senator Durbin described the proposed humanitarian exception in these very terms. See 152 
Cong. Rec. S5174; see also Immigration Reform Bill: Senate Judiciary Committee Markup (C-Span 
television broadcast Mar. 27, 2006) (Senator Durbin describing humanitarian exception as an affirma-
tive defense that defendant would have to prove). 
 363 Cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (describing qualified immunity as “im-
munity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability . . . ” and noting that such immunity is “effec-
tively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial”) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
526 (1985)). 
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Moreover, focusing on an “exception” for humanitarian assistance misses the 
point that the “bad act” at the root of smuggling and related offenses is not 
evading immigration authorities per se, but exploiting migrants’ desperation to 
procure financial or material benefit from their lack of safe travel options. The 
“material benefit” standard captures this concern more effectively. 
Ultimately, an affirmative defense would prove costly. Separating human-
itarian actors from for-profit smugglers requires time and expertise.364 Distin-
guishing the source of funds received by private actors, whether from donors 
or from the migrants themselves, is another task that would require authorities 
to parse facts and law carefully. Finally, subjecting humanitarian actors to 
prosecution and only later eliminating liability stands to reduce the supply of 
humanitarian aid. For all of these reasons, states might instead consider provid-
ing an administrative process of pre-approval for humanitarian actors,365 thus 
preventing needless prosecutions and expenditure of time and money by gov-
ernments and NGOs.366 
4. Accounting for Asylum States’ Interests 
Each of the proposals stands to frustrate national interests understood in a 
general sense.367 A humanitarian exception shields from liability NGOs and 
individuals who, for reasons other than procuring financial or material benefit, 
assist migrants, including asylum seekers. These migrants are typically indi-
viduals whom the government has not yet screened, thus implicating the na-
                                                                                                                           
 364 I thank Martha Minow for making this point specifically and for raising the general possibility 
of an administrative process to sort humanitarian from for-profit actors. 
 365 I thank Alyson Flournoy for raising this point. 
 366 The details of such a proposal are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 367 The proposals for reform also do not make or depend on distinctions among migrants. The 
proposed statutory revisions apply equally, no matter whether an unauthorized migrant seeks refugee 
status, some other form of humanitarian protection, or economic opportunity. Thus, the proposals are 
not designed solely to protect those who assist asylum seekers, but to protect those who assist all un-
authorized migrants. Avoiding this outcome appears impossible. First, if proposed reform were to 
apply exclusively to “asylum seekers,” NGOs would not know whom to assist. Without asking ques-
tions first, an NGO or coast guard officer will not know if a given migrant intends to apply for asy-
lum, and is, thus, an asylum seeker. Often, questioning cannot occur during rescue operations, when 
migrants are necessarily in distress. Second, a given boat of migrants could contain a mix of asylum 
seekers and economic migrants. Requiring rescuers to sort asylum seekers from economic migrants 
before rendering aid would likely prove unworkable. Finally, the distinction between the two groups 
of migrants is not always clear, and some economic migrants may ultimately have good claims for 
asylum, while some asylum seekers will ultimately lose their bid for refugee status and be deported. 
Better distinguishing the groups would require NGOs to engage in more probing questioning about 
the basis of the asylum claim—something ill-suited for situations where NGOs provide humanitarian 
assistance, especially in emergencies. Many migrants are asylum seekers, however, and thus, the pro-
posals contained here will often, but not exclusively, apply to asylum seekers. I thank Gerald Neuman 
for raising these issues. 
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tional security and crime control interests of asylum states.368 How might leg-
islators address this concern through the proposed reform?369 
One option is to limit the scope of the exception to exclude smuggling. 
Under this option, the humanitarian exception would extend only to acts com-
mitted after entry in the asylum state, i.e., to transport and harboring offenses. 
As in the Senate’s proposal, the humanitarian exception could be limited only 
to assistance rendered after the asylum seeker has entered on their own (or at a 
minimum, without help from the NGO seeking immunity from liability).370 
Thus, NGOs would not be immune to liability for smuggling itself. 
The law, however, ought to permit humanitarian smuggling when re-
quired under international law. When asylum seekers take dangerous journeys 
on the high seas—whether from Libya or Haiti—the international duty to res-
cue applies,371 and humanitarian actors bringing asylum seekers to shore for 
processing should not be subject to criminal liability for discharging their du-
ties. Criminalizing humanitarian smuggling—the act of bringing unauthorized 
migrants to the frontiers of asylum states’ territories—leaves NGOs with al-
most no alternative but to let refugees and migrants die in the water, a result 
that violates international law.372 Thus, immunity from liability for humanitari-
an smuggling is necessary in such scenarios. 
In contrast, humanitarian actors generally have no obligation under inter-
national law to rescue asylum seekers traveling by land, whether via Mexico or 
Turkey. As a result, international legal duties do not compel smuggling in those 
circumstances, and a more limited exception might be called for in such sce-
narios. Drafters of the humanitarian exception should consider these matters. 
                                                                                                                           
 368 See supra notes 194–295 and accompanying text. 
 369 The most obvious route is to promote policies that permit willing donors to serve willing mi-
grants without imposing any third-party costs. A private refugee sponsorship program, for example, 
would preserve the government’s usual role in screening incoming migrants and would not otherwise 
threaten asylum states’ interests. See Guide to the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, supra 
note 294. 
 370 See 152 CONG. REC. S5174 (remarks of Senator Durbin describing humanitarian exception); 
Breslin, supra note 37, at 241. 
 371 Nessel, supra note 117, at 626. This is not to suggest that individuals and organizations on 
land have a general obligation to bring asylum seekers to shore; rather, international law obligates 
only those at sea who encounter distressed vessels to make reasonable rescue efforts. See UNCLOS, 
supra note 117, at art. 98(1)(b). 
 372 See, e.g., International Convention on Salvage art. 10, Apr. 28, 1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-
12, 1953 U.N.T.S. 194 (“Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his 
vessel and persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in danger of being lost at sea.”); United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 98, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
(“Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so far as he can do so without serious 
danger to the ship, the crew or the passengers . . . to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of 
persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance.”); Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
annex, at c. 5, regulation 10, Nov. 1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47 (“The master of a ship at sea which is in a 
position to be able to provide assistance, on receiving a signal from any source that persons are in 
distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance.”). 
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Canada’s legal regime, which prohibits the criminalization of humanitarian 
smuggling, is well-suited to its particular status as an asylum state that receives 
large numbers of asylum seekers who have traveled by sea.373 In contrast, such 
a regime may ultimately be wrong for the United States, which has a porous 
border with Mexico, a country that itself receives a large number of asylum 
seekers fleeing violence.374 
Humanitarian aid is not a cure for the suffering of millions of asylum seek-
ers, but it is a way of creating organic change; of slowly untying a seemingly 
indissoluble knot of violence, poverty, insecurity, and exclusion through uncoor-
dinated, unmediated action. Protecting humanitarian actors is an important step 
in creating a culture that values human lives, even migrant ones. 
CONCLUSION 
Individuals and organizations around the world provide or wish to pro-
vide humanitarian aid to asylum seekers, and such aid currently manifests in 
many forms and in a range of places—from the asylum seeker’s home country 
to the asylum state and all points in between. The laws prohibiting smuggling 
and related offenses in the United States and the European Union criminalize 
much of this aid. At the very least, these laws create a cloud of legal uncertain-
ty under which humanitarian actors provide aid with some risk of prosecution. 
Until recently, Canadian law did the same. These laws, although over-
inclusive, are based on core interests in national security, crime control, and 
economic preservation. 
By acknowledging these core interests but also exposing their thinness, 
this Article argues for a specific reform to ease the toll of the dilemma. Specif-
ically, it proposes law reform: creating a humanitarian exception to anti-
                                                                                                                           
 373 See Appulonappa, 3 S.C.R. ¶ 5 (“[I]nsofar as [the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act] 
permits prosecution for humanitarian aid to undocumented entrants, mutual assistance amongst asy-
lum-seekers or assistance to family members, it is unconstitutional.”); CANADIAN COUNCIL ON REFU-
GEES, SUN SEA: FIVE YEARS LATER 14 (Aug. 2015), http://ccrweb.ca/sites/ccrweb.ca/files/sun-sea-
five-years-later.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TQT-NPBE] (noting the Canadian government’s “increased 
priority” to “disrupt people smuggling, especially by sea”). But see Mike Blanchfield, Haitian Asylum 
Seekers Flee to Canada After Trump Proposes End to Protected Status, GLOBAL NEWS (Aug. 27, 
2017), http://globalnews.ca/news/3699160/haitian-asylum-seekers-canada-trump-end-protected-status/ 
[https://perma.cc/EG4R-QN7U]. 
 374 See John Burnett, U.S.-Mexico Border Sees Resurgence of Central Americans Seeking Asylum, 
NPR (May 31, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/05/31/480073262/u-s-mexico-border-sees-resurgence-
of-central-americans-seeking-asylum [https://perma.cc/W436-HWSB] (noting that although “U.S. 
Border Patrol averaged 330 apprehensions of Central Americans a day,” the agency nevertheless 
“ends up releasing the vast majority of family members it apprehends because U.S. court rulings re-
strict its ability to detain them”). But see W. Gardner Selby, Barack Obama, in Austin, Says Illegal 
Immigration at 40-Year Low, POLITIFACT (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/texas/
statements/2016/mar/17/barack-obama/barack-obama-austin-says-illegal-immigration-40-ye/ [https://
perma.cc/V3GR-CWE]. 
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harboring and anti-transport laws and, in some instances, anti-smuggling laws. 
It further proposes law reform through which asylum seekers can obtain travel 
authorization or status prior to making a long, perilous journey to the asylum 
state. Such reforms would potentially obviate the need for much of the private 
humanitarian aid provided today. 
The widespread desire to provide private humanitarian aid to refugees and 
migrants, and the pervasive criminalization of such aid create a dilemma that is 
neither new nor unique to this context. Scholars have rightly characterized the 
clash of state sovereignty, border control, and individual human rights as a 
“wicked problem.”375 Such problems do not lend themselves to neat solutions, 
either in law or politics.376 They often point to the need for large-scale institu-
tional transformations. Here, the dilemma identified is a symptom of a legal 
regime that is not equipped to regulate migration and protect refugees effec-
tively.377 Without economic, political, and social development in refugee-
producing countries and reductions in global inequality, little will change, and 
the demand to reach asylum states—by any means necessary—will only 
rise.378 
These stark global trends create the backdrop and impetus for the re-
sponses that have followed: individuals and NGOs in the United States and 
around the world working, individually, locally, and immediately, to meet the 
urgent needs of those seeking refuge. They are sending donations to rebuild 
war-torn villages; rescuing asylum seekers making perilous journeys; sending 
baby carriers to ease the physical burdens of refugee parents crossing a conti-
nent with young children in their arms; and welcoming asylum seekers with 
food, shelter, clothing, foreign language instruction, and other necessities to 
help them integrate into the asylum states they have reached while awaiting the 
adjudication of their claims for asylum. 
                                                                                                                           
 375 GALLAGHER & DAVID, supra note 84, at 18 (quoting JEFFREY CONKLIN, DIALOGUE MAP-
PING: BUILDING SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF WICKED PROBLEMS 13–16 (2006) (describing criteria 
for so-called “wicked problems”)). 
 376 Id. (defining a “wicked problem” as a dynamic problem that is difficult to define or resolve 
“because of preexisting factors that are themselves highly resistance to change,” such as “the very 
existence of States, gross inequalities among them, and strong motivations on the part of some to keep 
out others”). 
 377 See id. at 17 (“Migration is one of the oldest strategies of human advancement and . . . it is 
unsurprising that the modern Nation State, specifically liberal democracies, are not up to the task of 
stopping it.”). 
 378 Id. at 18 (asserting that smuggling will endure as a key method of unregulated migration un-
less there is a “fundamental change to global migration governance,” and that to deny this fact is a 
“willful disregard of both evidence and experience”); see also id. (quoting the U.N. Special Rappor-
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Asylum states and the international community can do more. They can 
facilitate the work of private humanitarian actors. Public-private partnerships 
and collaborations are not new, but they are increasingly important in emer-
gency situations. Moreover, although private humanitarian aid is no substitute 
for effective, humane government policy, it constitutes a form of profound en-
gagement in the world.379 To criminalize private humanitarian actors’ direct 
service to asylum seekers is to deny completely any role for private actors in 
the assertion of asylum rights, an extreme position not justified by states’ inter-
ests. Taken together, the proposals articulated in this Article offer a humane 
path forward. 
                                                                                                                           
 379 See Corbett, supra note 173; see also SOLNIT, supra note 1, at 95 (“These other versions of 
what revolution means suggest that the goal is not so much to go on and create the world as to live in 
that time of creation, and with this the emphasis shifts from institutional power to the power of con-
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